In order to assess the competing roles of dispositional optimism and neuroticism on reactivity to psychological stress, we selected 50 women (mean age = 18.76 years; SD = 1.9 years) from a screening sample of 150 college students on the basis of having high and low scores in dispositional optimism . In a laboratory, participants provided cardiovascular measures before, during, and after a mentally challenging task, as well as anxiety scores before and after the task. Participants also supplied measures of neuroticism and ratings of task-stressfulness. It was found that neuroticism and not optimism exerted an influence on diastolic blood pressure responses, that neither variable influenced systolic blood pressure responses except in the case of unstable change scores, and that the two variables suppressed each other's influence on anxiety levels (but that neuroticism had a stronger association with anxiety). It was also found that participants' ratings of the stressfulness of the laboratory task, although positively associated with cardiovascular reactivity, did not mediate the relationships among optimism, neuroticism, and cardiovascular measures. The present study confirms the suspicion that optimism is not independent from neuroticism as an index of disease risk.
In order to assess the competing roles of dispositional optimism and neuroticism on reactivity to psychological stress, we selected 50 women (mean age = 18.76 years; SD = 1.9 years) from a screening sample of 150 college students on the basis of having high and low scores in dispositional optimism . In a laboratory, participants provided cardiovascular measures before, during, and after a mentally challenging task, as well as anxiety scores before and after the task. Participants also supplied measures of neuroticism and ratings of task-stressfulness. It was found that neuroticism and not optimism exerted an influence on diastolic blood pressure responses, that neither variable influenced systolic blood pressure responses except in the case of unstable change scores, and that the two variables suppressed each other's influence on anxiety levels (but that neuroticism had a stronger association with anxiety). It was also found that participants' ratings of the stressfulness of the laboratory task, although positively associated with cardiovascular reactivity, did not mediate the relationships among optimism, neuroticism, and cardiovascular measures. The present study confirms the suspicion that optimism is not independent from neuroticism as an index of disease risk.
The notion that positive thinking can affect individual behavior and influence the way a person reacts to adversity has proliferated in both popular and academic contexts over the years (e.g., Cousins, 1977; Peale, 1956) . Psychometrically, the term dispositional optimism (Scheier & Carver, 1985) is used to refer to a person's tendency to be motivated by a belief that desired outcomes are easily attainable. Although the notion of optimism as a measurable individual difference variable is now most closely associated with the work of Charles S. Carver and Michael F. Scheier (e.g., Carver, Reynolds, & Scheier, 1994; Carver & Scheier, 1981 Carver, Scheier, & Weintraub, 1989; Sheier & Carver, 1985 , 1987 Scheier, Carver, & Bridges, 1994) , psychological Table 1 shows the mean and standard deviations for the various cardiovascular parameters during the three stages of the experiment (prestressor, midstressor, and poststressor), as well as prestressor and poststressor scores for anxiety; for each subgroup and overall. The mean score for neuroticism across the entire sample was 12.96 (SO = 6.4); for the high-and low-optimism subgroups these means were 8.77 (SO = 5.6) and 16.25 (SO = 5.1), respectively. The difference in neuroticism between the two groups was highly significant, ~48) = 4.98, P < .001, and was represented by a significant inverse correlation between neuroticism and optimism, Pearson's r= -.706, n = 50, P < .001. Thus, the assessment of the respective roles of optimism and neuroticism as independent variables in stressresponsivity relationships appeared justified. This was conducted by using mixed analyses of variance (ANOVAs) to assess the impact of optimism (group) on repeated cardiovascular and anxiety measures (pre-, mid-, and poststressor for cardiovascular measures; pre-and poststressor for anxiety) , followed by analyses of covariance (ANCOVAs) to assess the impact of neuroticism as a covariate on the observed relationships. As a means of assessing reactivity, repeated measures analyses are preferable to the analysis of change scores (i.e., increments in blood pressure caused by stressors), in that they preserve individual differences in baseline levels of function in the statistical analysis. Where a role for neuroticism was implicated, it was further explored by computing a pair of partial correlations: firstly correlating optimism with the target dependent variable while partialling out the variance attributable to neuroticism, and secondly correlating neuroticism with the target variable while partialling out optimism. (Partial correlation allowed the use of continuous LOT-R scores rather than group membership as a measure of optimism.) Comparison between the two partial correlations allowed the relative strengths of optimism and neuroticism, as predictors of stress responses, to be evaluated . The mean stressfulness rating was 7.1 (SO = 1.8). Ratings of stressfulness demonstrated an inverse correlation with optimism, r = -.307, n = 50, P = .030, and a positive correlation with neuroticism, r = +.310 , n = 50, P = .028.
Results

Descriptive Statistics and Analytic Strategy
OBp, Optimism, and Neuroticism
To test the effect of optimism on DBP reactivity, a 2 (optimism) x 3 (time) mixed ANOVA was conducted . Mauchley's test for sphericity showed that the assumption of sphericity had not been violated , W 2 = .89 , P = .06. The ANOVA revealed a main effect for time, F(2, 96) = 49.22, P < .001, but no main effect for optimism , F(1 , 48) = .22, p = .64, nor any optimism x time interaction, F(2, 96) = .24, P = .78. To test the potential suppressing effects of neuroticism, a corresponding ANCOVA was conducted , adding neuroticism as a covariate. Again, Mauchley's test for sphericity showed that the assumption of sphericity had not been violated , W 2 = .93, P = .21. The ANCOVA revealed no significant main or interaction effects involving optimism, but did reveal a significant time x neuroticism interaction, F(2, 94) = 5.72, p = .005. Bivariate correlations revealed this interaction to be the result of a significant positive correlation between neuroticism and DBP during the midstressor phase, r = +.283, n = 50, P = .046, but not during the prestressor, r = -.029, n = 50, P = .84, or poststressor phases, r = +.056, n = 50 , P = .70.
To further explore this implied role for neuroticism, the various relationships were explored using bivariate and partial correlations, thus allowing continuous LOT-R scores to be used as measures of optimism (rather than the group-membership dichotomy). Given that DBP during stress was revealed as the source of the significant time x neuroticism interaction in the ANCOVA, that measure of DBP was targeted in these correlations. The correlation between neuroticism and DBP remained significant when controlling for optimism using partial correlation, 1'(47) = +.323 , p = .024. However, there was neither a significant bivariate correlation between optimism and DBP, r = -.078, n = 50, P = .59, nor a significant partial correlation between the variables when neuroticism was controlled for, 1'(47) = +.179, p = .22. The pattern of partial correlations suggests that neuroticism bore an association with DBP reactivity, whereas optimism did not.
SBp, Optimism, and Neuroticism
Another 2 (optimism) x 3 (time) mixed ANOVA was conducted to test the effect of optimism on SBP reactivity. Without having violated the assumption of sphericity, W 2 = .94, P = .21, the ANOVA revealed a main effect for time, F(2 , 96) = 18.04, P < .001 , but no main effect for optimism , F(1 , 48) = .38, p = .54, nor any optimism x time interaction , F(2, 96) = .68, p = .51 . The corresponding ANCOVA, with neuroticism added as a highlighting their relative weakness. Indeed, it could be argued that the predictive nature of optimism in practical contexts was all but suppressed when the other variables were controlled for.
The present study sought to investigate the effects of dispositional optimism on cardiovascular and psychological responses to psychological stress. The study also aims to examine the possible moderating effects of neuroticism in these relationships, and in particular to assess whether associations involving optimism remain significant when neuroticism is statistically controlled.
Method
Participants
Participants were 50 women recruited from a screening sample enrolled in an undergraduate course in psychology at an urban university. The screening sample consisted of 128 women and 22 men who were invited to complete a battery of questionnaires for course credit. Participants were selected on the basis of scores on a psychometric assessment of dispositional optimism (selection was limited to participants with scores in the top and bottom quartiles), age (selection was limited to participants under the age of 25 years), and gender (only females were selected). The approach of selecting from the extremes of the distribution was chosen to underpin a two-group experimental design while avoiding the conceptual problems associated with median splits (which are caused by the presence of large numbers of potentially miscategorized borderline cases; see, for example, Veiel, 1988) .
All participants who met the criteria and who were willing to take part were included. This yielded a final study sample comprising a lowoptimism group (n = 28; mean LOT-R score = 8.93, SO = 2.8) and a highoptimism group (n = 22; mean LOT-R score = 20.00, SO = 1.7), with a highly significant between-group difference in optimism, t(48) = 16.33, P < .001. The mean age of participants was 18.76 years (SO = 1.9 years). The mean age of participants in the low-optimism group was 19.04 years (SO = 2.3 years), and of those in the high-optimism group was 18.41 years (SO = 1.1 years). This between-group difference in age was nonsignificant, t(48) = 1.17, P > .2. Participants in the study sample were given additional course credit in return for their continuing participation.
Assessments of Optimism, Neuroticism, and Anxiety
The screening questionnaire included the LOT-R of Scheier et al. (1994) . The instrument comprises 10 statements with which respondents rate their agreement on a 5-point scale (e.g,. 'In uncertain times, I usually expect the best,' and 'I hardly ever expect things to go my way'). The authors report satisfactory psychometric properties, including high internal consistency (a = .78), and test-retest reliability after 28 months of .79. Neuroticism was measured using the revised version of the Eysenck Personality Questionnaire (EPQ-R; Eysenck & Eysenck, 1994 ), a 106-
. . . item scale containing three personality subscales (neuroticism , introversion/extraversion , and psychoticism). It is one of the most widely used personality inventories in psychology, the psychometric properties of which have been well established across a range of studies (e.g., neuroticism subscale ex = .85; Eysenck & Eysenck, 1994) . Anxiety was assessed using the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI; Spielberger, Gorusch, & Lushene, 1970) , an inventory of two 20-item forms assessing both state and trait anxiety. It too is one of the most used psychometric instruments in its area, of repeatedly confi rmed psychometric soundness (for example, test-retest reliability after 104 days for trait anxiety of .65; Spielberger et aI. , 1970) .
Cardiovascular Measures
Systolic blood pressure (SBP), diastolic blood pressure (DBP) , and heart rate (HR) activity were assessed using a Lafayette Instrument Company Blood Pressure Monitor, Model 78044, a portable electronic monitor with automatic inflation and deflation of a standard blood pressure cuff. Possible measurement ranges were 0-299 mmHg for SBP/DBP, and 40-180 bpm for HR; with margins for error of ±3 mmHg and ±3%, respectively.
Procedure
On arrival at the laboratory, each participant completed a short battery of questionnaires that included the EPQ-R and the trait anxiety form of the STAI , as well as questions relating to physical and demographic information. On completion, the participant sat quietly for a 5-min resting period after which the blood pressure cuff was placed onto the dominant arm. During a further 3-min baseline period, cardiovascular readings were taken each min and averaged to compute baseline levels. The participant was then instructed to engage in a serial subtraction stressor task of counting backwards in 7s from 1500, as quickly as possible. Such serial subtraction tasks are widely used as stressors in cardiovascular reactivity research and are known to precipitate substantial elevations in cardiovascular parameters (Turner, 1994) . The task lasted for 3 min, during which cardiovascular readings were again taken every min and averaged in order to establish elevated cardiovascular levels. After the task had concluded, the participant was given the state anxiety form of the STAI, as well as a question asking for a rating of stressfulness for the counting task on a scale of 0 (not at all stressful) to 10 (very stressful). After having completed these final questionnaires, the participant was asked to sit comfortably for a further 5min resting period, during which further sets of cardiovascular readings were obtained and averaged to yield poststressor levels. The participant was given an initial oral debriefing in the laboratory; and at the conclusion of the study, all participants were mailed a written debriefing sheet describing the rationale of the experiment and its findings. treatments of optimism have emerged throughout the history of personality psychology, including in the work of Alfred Adler, George Kelly, Kurt Lewin, and Julian Rotter (ct. Peterson , 2000) . As might be anticipated, optimism has been hypothesized to exert many beneficial effects on people's psychological and physical health. As well as being inversely associated with measures of depressive symptomology (Vickers & Vogeltanz, 2000) , optimism has been associated with positive adjustment to major illnesses, such as heart disease (e.g., Scheier et aI., 1989) , cancer (e.g., Carver et aI., 1994; Stanton & Snider, 1993) , and HIV (e.g., Taylor et aI., 1991) . Optimism has also been implicated as a major contributor to, or at least a marker of, enhanced quality of life among ill people (e.g., Fitzgerald, Tennen, Affleck, & Pransky, 1993) ; and among well people, optimism has been identified as being associated with fewer and less intense self-reported physical health problems (e.g., Hamid, 1990; Scheier & Carver, 1985; Schwarzer, Hahn , & Jerusalem, 1993) . Broadly speaking, optimism is believed to contribute to well-being primarily by enhancing the individual's ability to cope with stress (presumably by making the desired outcome, stress-reduction, appear more achievable; cf. Scheier, Carver, & Bridges, 2001) . Optimism is also thought to exert other effects that help reduce stress, including enhancement of the individual's social network (Brissette, Scheier, & Carver, 2002) .
Many alleged psychosocial stress moderators have been tested in the cardiovascular stress laboratory. Laboratory testing allows for hypothesized psychosomatic pathways to be examined in controlled settings and in large numbers of healthy participants. This helps clarify the role of psychosocial factors in illness progression beyond the level achievable with epidemiological datasets, which are normally drawn from populations with preexisting levels of disease morbidity and from diverse settings where extraneous factors remain uncontrolled . Measures of cardiovascular reactivity (namely, elevations in heart rate and blood pressure in response to controlled laboratory stressors) not only illustrate the general extent of the individual's stress response, but also represent a specific index of lifetime risk for cardiovascular disease among currently healthy participants. The potential association between cardiovascular reactivity and cardiovascular disease is commonly articulated as the reactivity hypothesis (Light, Sherwood , & Turner, 1992) and has broadly been supported by the research evidence (e.g., Carroll et aI., 2001) . Among the psychosocial stress moderators that have been repeatedly examined in laboratory studies of cardiovascular reactivity are Type A behavior (e.g., Sundin, Oehman, Palm, & Stroem, 1995) , hostility (e.g, . Bongard, al'Absi, & Lovallo, 1998) , self-esteem (e.g., Rasmussen, Willingham, & Glover, 1996) , locus of control (e.g., Mueller, Guenther, Habel, & Rockstroh, 1998) , and social support (e.g., Hughes & Curtis, 2000) . However, dispositional optimism has been relatively neglected in cardiovascular reactivity research, with only one published laboratory study emerging in electronic literature searches. This study (Williams, Riels, & Roper, 1990) found that participants classified as pessimists demonstrated higher diastolic blood pressure (DBP) reactivity than optimists to a mental arithmetic task.
The psychometric instrument normally used to measure optimism, which was utilized by Williams et aI., is the Life Orientation Test (LOT; Scheier & Carver, 1985) . However, many researchers have criticized this scale, and indeed the optimism construct itself, on the grounds that the effects of optimism are subordinate to those of a number of third variables. Researchers have implied that the statistical relationships associating optimism with mental and physical well-being become nonsignificant when variables such as neuroticism (Boland & Cappeliez, 1997; Smith, Pope, Rhodewalt, & Poulton , 1989) , self-esteem (Fontaine & Jones, 1997) , and self-mastery (Marshall & Lang , 1990 ) are controlled. Indeed, it has recently been implied that these variables intercorrelate to such an extent that it is likely they all represent overlapping aspects of a single personality factor (Judge, Erez, Bono, & Thoresen , 2002) . In response to similar criticisms, Scheier et al. (1994) reevaluated the LOT using samples of 4,309 participants to show that optimism was associated with depression scores even after controlling for self-mastery, trait anxiety, self-esteem, and neuroticism. Nonetheless, despite this the authors recommended some minor modifications to the LOT in order to eliminate items that failed to directly represent coping-related constructs and to balance the number of positively and negatively worded items in the resulting scale. This resulted in the formulation of the Revised Life Orientation Test (LOT-R) .
Although the analyses of Scheier et al. suggested that optimism operates as a unique predictor of depression , a number of caveats should be borne in mind. Firstly, subsequent studies have continued to produce data that question the ability of optimism scores (either LOT scores or LOT-R scores) to predict various outcomes after statistically controlling for related predictors (e.g., Boland & Cappeliez, 1997; Fontaine & Jones, 1997) . Secondly, in the reevaluation by Scheier et aI. , trivariate partial correlations were used to control the variance of related predictors using very large samples of participants. Subsequent studies that have found optimism to be suppressed by related predictors have used more powerful statistical techniques but smaller samples. Thus, although LOT scores may prove to be unique predictors of target variances in some situations, these may be dependent on sample-size and/or statistical technique. Overall, if the alleged predictive qualities of optimism are revealed in only very large samples, then the practical utility of the construct is debatable. Thirdly, even though controlling for related factors failed to completely suppress predictive relationships for optimism in the data of Scheier et aI., it certainly reduced optimism's predictive effectiveness. For example, whereas the bivariate correlation between optimism and depression was -.42, second-order correlations after controlling for neuroticism, self-mastery, trait anxiety, and self-esteem fell to -.28, -.24, -.19, and -.18, respectively. Whether all these relationships would have remained significant in smaller samples is doubtful, further covariate revealed no significant main or interaction effects involving optimism, nor any time x neuroticism interaction.
Despite the absence of effects, it was decided to conduct a further, tentative exploration of the situation based on partial correlations. Given that no particular measure of SSP (Le., pre-, mid-, or poststressor) had been implicated as having a relationship with either neuroticism or optimism , a measure of SSP reactivity (midstressor SSP-prestressor SSP) was computed for use in the partial correlations. Having partialled out the effect of neuroticism, the correlation between optimism and SSP reactivity was significant and positive, r{47) = +.297, p = .039. Partialling out the effect of optimism showed the correlation between neuroticism and SSP reactivity also to be significant and positive, with a slightly larger effect size, r{47) = +.324, p = .023.
HR, Optimism, and Neuroticism
A third 2 (optimism) x 3 (time) mixed ANOVA was conducted to test the effect of optimism on HR reactivity. On this occasion, the assumption of sphericity was violated, W 2 = .75, P = .001, and so repeated-measures degrees of freedom were adjusted using the Greenhouse-Geisser correction (£ = .80). The ANOVA revealed a main effect for time, F(1 .6, 76.6) = 17.24, P < .001, but no main effect for optimism nor any optimism x time interaction. The corresponding ANCOVA, with neuroticism added as a covariate revealed no significant main or interaction effects involving optimism, nor any time x neuroticism interaction (the assumption of sphericity having again been violated; W 2 = .73, P = .001 ; £ = .79). There were no significant bivariate or partial correlations involving either optimism or neuroticism and HR reactivity (Le. , midstressor HR-prestressor HR).
Anxiety, Optimism, and Neuroticism
Finally, in order to test the effect of optimism on anxiety, a 2 (optimism) x 2 (time; pre-and poststressor) mixed ANOVA was conducted. The ANOVA revealed a main effect for time, F(1 , 48) = 11.27, P = .002, a main effect for optimism, F(1 , 48) = 22.07, p < .001 , and an optimism x time interaction, F(1, 48) = 5.55, p = .023. Post hoc comparisons of means revealed that pessimists had significantly higher prestressor anxiety, ~48) = 3.32 , P = .002, and poststressor anxiety, ~48) = 5.27, P < .001, and that there was a significant overall increase in anxiety over time, ~49) = 3.51, P = .001 . The interaction occurred as follows. For pessimists there was a significant change in anxiety over time, ~27) = 4.01 , P < .001, but for optimists there was none, ~21) = .75, P = .46. These relationships were represented by significant bivariate correlations between anxiety reactivity (poststressor anxiety-prestressor anxiety) and both optimism , r = -.326, n = 50, P = .021, and neuroticism, r= +.360, n = 50, P = .010.
However, the corresponding ANCOVA with neuroticism added as a covariate revealed no significant main or interaction effects involving optimism , nor any time x neuroticism interaction. This situation was further explored using partial correlation . Controlling for neuroticism , the correlation between optimism and anxiety reactivity was no longer significant, r(47) = -.109, P = .46; correspondingly, controlling for optimism , the correlation between neuroticism and anxiety reactivity was no longer significant, r(47) = +.194, p = .18.
Check for Ratings of Stressfulness
Given that significant correlations existed between ratings of stressfulness and both optimism and neuroticism, all the ANCOVAs referred to above were reconducted, this time adding stressful ness-ratings to neuroticism in the list of covariates. These ratings did not alter the previously observed pattern of associations involving optimism and neuroticism, or their significance. However, a time x stressfulness-ratings interaction was found with respect to HR, F(1.6 , 74.4) = 3.81, P = .035; Mauchley's test for sphericity: W 2 = .76, P = .002; Greenhouse-Geisser correction, t: = .81. The interaction occurred as follows. Whereas there was virtually no correlation between ratings of stressfulness and either prestressor HR, r= .003, n = 50, P = .99, or poststressor HR, r = .005, n = 50, P = .97, the correlation between stressfulness-ratings and midstressor HR was much higher, and approached significance, r = +.276, n = 50, P = .052.
Checks for Distribution of Optimism Scores
Although the two groups of participants for the present study were selected on the basis of extreme scores for optimism, some of the statistical analyses of optimism (namely, the partial correlation analyses) were based on the continuous LOT-R scores that underlay the categorization. This raises the question of what effect the removal of part of the natural distribution of optimism scores might have had on this variable. In other words, is it fair to treat a variable as continuous after having cut out much of its distribution? In order to evaluate this, the LOT-R scores were ranked, and the analyses repo rted above were reconducted using the ranks of the LOT-R scores in place of the raw LOT-R scores. The pattern of Significant and nonsignificant partial correlations involving optimism was identical to that observed using the raw LOT-R scores, with just one exception: The correlation between SSP reactivity and optimism when partialling out neuroticism was no longer significant, r(47) = +.276, p = .055. (Nonetheless, the correlation between SSP reactivity and neuroticism when partialling out optimism remained significant; r(47) = +.310, P = .030.) Overall, the analyses based on ranked scores confirmed the appropriateness of treating LOT-R scores as continuous in this case, even though part of the distribution was deliberately cut out during sample selection.
Discussion
An important objective of the present study was to assess the comparative validity of dispositional optimism and neuroticism as indices of cardiovascular and psychological reactions to stress. Taking each measure of stress-response in turn (namely, DBP, SBP, HR, and anxiety), the main findings can be summarized as follows . Firstly, only neuroticism-and not optimism-demonstrated an effect on DBP functioning. Neuroticism was shown to be positively associated with DBP reactivity (as evidenced by a relationship with midstressor levels of DBP, but not with pre-or poststressor levels). Secondly, although both optimism and neuroticism demonstrated a relationship with SBP reactivity, the relationship involving neuroticism was associated with a slightly stronger effect size (although this emerged only from partial correlations, and not from repeated-measures ANOVAs). Thirdly, HR was found to bear no relationship with either optimism or neuroticism in any analyses. Fourthly, although optimism was found to be associated with the attenuation of stress-related increases in anxiety, it appears that neuroticism had an opposite and statistically stronger effect. Thus, with the exception of HR (for which there was no significant relevant association), all the stressresponse variables in the present study bore a stronger association with neuroticism than with optimism. Taking account of the inverse correlation (and conceptual mirroring) between the two variables, the claim that optimism is likely to be conceptually subordinate to neuroticism appears to be supported.
The manipulation check involving ratings of stressful ness confirmed (in the case of HR) that cardiovascular reactivity was highest among those participants who felt most under stress. It would appear, therefore, that cardiovascular elevations were somewhat valid indices of stress in the current study. This is important to note given that the elevated levels of cardiovascular function in the present study were not pathological or representative of cardiovascular risk (in reactivity research, the operationalization of stress in cardiovascular terms is often relative rather than absolute). Interestingly, ratings of stressfulness did not interact with either optimism or neuroticism when influencing stress responsivity. This suggests that although optimism and neuroticism might be associated with differing levels of physiological stress responsivity, and although both variables correlate significantly with stress-ratings, optimism and neuroticism may not exert their physiological effects by making the participant subjectively 'feel' more or less under stress.
The findings were somewhat alike for DBP and anxiety. In the case of both variables, neuroticism was positively associated with stress responses, suggesting that participants high in neuroticism exhibited maladaptive reactions to the stressor. In the case of DBP, no relationship with optimism was found. In the case of anxiety, optimism demonstrated an inverse association (suggestive of a stress-buffering effect), and when optimism and neuroticism were analyzed simultaneously, they appeared to suppress one another's impact altogether. Nonetheless, the probability values associated with the bivariate correlations with anxiety reactivity revealed a greater effect size for neuroticism. In brief, the implication of these results is that neuroticism possesses a stronger association with measures of stress responsivity, than does optimism. However, the findings for SBP initially appear surprising . Partial correlations suggest that both neuroticism and optimism demonstrated positive associations with SBP reactivity. Such a pattern seems to imply that both variables were predictive of exaggerated stress responsivity, at least in terms of SBP ; and this does not sit comfortably alongside either the associations with DBP and anxiety or the fact that the correlation between neuroticism and optimism was in a strongly inverse direction. It is however possible that the positive correlation between optimism and SBP reactivity was a statistical artifact, arising from the use of changescores to represent SBP reactivity. Most authors caution against the computation of correlations between change-scores (Campbell & Kenny, 1999; Judd & Kenny, 1981) , pointing out that spurious associations frequently emerge due to inadequate statistical control of individual differences in the baseline variable, among other factors. Alternatively, the correlation with optimism may be an artifact of the distribution of LOT-R scores. When ranks of LOT-R scores were used, the correlation between SBP reactivity and optimism when partialling out neuroticism became nonsignificant, but the correlation with neuroticism when partial ling out optimism retained significance. Thus, the use of ranks generated a pattern of correlations consistent with the view that neuroticism is a stronger predictor of SBP reactivity than is optimism. In any event, the statistically stronger approach of using a repeated-measures ANOVA to take simultaneous account of elevated and resting levels of SBP did not reveal any associations with either optimism or neuroticism; hence, overall, it may be safer to assume that no association with optimism or neuroticism existed.
Interpreting the results of the present study, it appears that neuroticism might well be the underlying factor in what has traditionally been reported as an optimism-stress response relationship. Such a conclusion is consistent with research assessing physical and mental health in clinical samples (e.g., Boland & Cappeliez, 1997; Smith et aI., 1989) , as well as with longstanding theoretical work in the field (e.g., Smith et aI. , 1989) . However, unlike in previous research, which has focused on samples drawn from clinically relevant populations, the present study establishes this principle in the context of disease risk markers among healthy participants. This means that the results are not likely to be confounded by the presence of other disease risk factors in the sample, by participants' medication use, by potential referral biases among health service providers, or by the reliance on retrospective participant-recollection of key data. This last point is particularly salient when considering a variable like neuroticism. Scheier and Carver (1992) themselves have argued that correlations between neuroticism and selfreported health status are susceptible to inherent confounding on the basis that participants who score high in neuroticism are likely to rate their own health as poor. Given that self-reporting of symptoms by clients leads to a greater detection of illness by health professionals, this logic may also apply to some extent to health status that has been independently established in clinical settings. However, an association between neuroticism and cardiovascular functioning is not open to such an interpretation. Accordingly, the present study represents an important contribution to the optimism-neuroticism debate.
In the context of future research, consideration should be given to a number of points. The present study utilized an all-female sample. It is interesting that in their analysis of the LOT, Scheier and Carver (1985) found optimism to independently predict a significant amount of the variance in reports of physical symptoms among only men. Therefore, it could be that any effect of optimism is gender specific. Unfortunately, due to a small number of men in the sampling population, the issue of gender differences could not be explored in the present study. Secondly, the stressor task used (mental arithmetic) may have required coping abilities that were unlikely to benefit from high levels of dispositional optimism. Future research might explore whether different demands on the individual's ability to cope would influence the importance of optimism as a stress buffer. Finally, given the evidence provided by Judge et al. (2002) , it may be that a range of related variables possess similar relationships with neuroticism, with regard to their impact on health. Continuing scrutiny of such variables serves to increase our understanding of the causal mechanisms underlying heart disease development, and may also serve to inform the nature of appropriate psychological interventions for cardiac patients.
